Neo-Colonization of Electoral Politics: Evidence from Hybrid Regime, Pakistan

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Abstract--- The electoral politics is changing with dynamic interplay of electoral rhetoric, slogans and manifestoes under the influence of neo-liberal norms. The encompassing role of neo-liberal norms tend to facilitate hegemonic power dominance. In hybrid democracy Pakistan, military has been constantly pushing itself for achieving hegemonic power status to influence several policy preferences. These preferences are propagated through different political channels like policy preferences of political parties by formulating voter choices at different stages. The militarized hegemonic apparatus applies various strategies to consolidate political hegemony as manifestation of neo-colonization. The militarized hegemonic power structure tends to take firm control into economic field through covert facilitation of specific 'political party' as democratic smokescreen/façade. Political system laminated by ideology (Religion) is used to legitimize control of material conditions in the larger interest of hegemonic power structure. The rapid transmutation of mass opinion manufacturing through cyber means by information corporatized production have become effective tools. Therefore, contemporary political environment offers altogether different political resources to the military leaders of colonizing the political system by favoring one and constraining rest of political machines or parties. Thus, the structural shift of urbanization pushed commercialization that led to advanced form of capital accumulation produces adverse effects on the subordinate masses. The recent electoral event 2018 saw that high middle class and low-income groups got pushed into electoral rhetoric through populist notion 'change' by newly formed political vehicle Pakistan Tehreek i Insaf (PTI). Thereby, the concept of duality in dialectical contradiction and unity have become permanent feature of electoral politics in hybrid regime like Pakistan. Thereby finally, the electoral history shows several examples of governmental power under control of covert hegemonic actors as instruments of neo-colonization of electoral politics.

Keywords--- Hybrid democracy, Neo-colonization, Urbanization, Hegemonic power, Dialectics.

I. INTRODUCTION

The term Neo-colonization is the practice of using capitalist norms, globalization and cultural imperial domination to influence underdeveloped societies instead of the earlier colonial ways of direct military control (imperialism) or indirect political control (hegemony). The term is coined by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in 1956.

Shortly after it was first utilized by Kwame Nkrumah in the context of African countries passing through de-colonization in the 1960's. Neo-colonialism is elaborated in the works of such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism (1964) and Noam Chomsky, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (1979).

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Therefore, the idea of neo-colonization is implied in the present study that how representation and electoral processes are becoming instruments of control and manufactured choices. The representation under colonial period had long been used as tool of political governance. It is now imperative to investigate that how hegemonic power adopts ways and methods to colonize subordinate masses under the catchy rubric of electoral representation in contemporary age (Tahir, 2009).

Party politics and their electoral strategies seems supportive to neo-colonization entrenched in neoliberal policy choices. Harvey (2007) points out, neoliberalism is a process that ostensibly seeks to organize society and economies around the principle of free market activity, while primarily attempting to shift the balance of power towards dominant economic classes that control capital. The convergence of neo-colonialism and neo-liberalism translate policy prescription through many apparent divergent rhetoric of political parties.

The present endeavour concentrates on analysing relevant references of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) rise and fall in post 1999 period. However, during this period how party attained fluid dominant status twice yet failed to attain stable dominant party status. The discussion will also highlight recent populist rise of Pakistan Tehreek i Insaf (PTI) under corporate media campaigns. While political manipulation through deep penetrative social media have worked as tool of hegemonic power. The Pakistan Tehreek i Insaaf (PTI) reference is pertinent to comprehend factors that hindered Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) journey to become stable dominant party. Therefore, the present study about electoral politics embarks upon explaining party politics in changing dynamics of electoral rhetoric, slogans and manifestoes (Adeyanju, 2016) under the neo-liberal norms as tools of neo-colonization. The key role of military leadership at different stages of Pakistan's short history is analysed to uncover various strategies of neo-colonization through electoral representation. These takeovers and strategies invite close analysis of evolving role of covert hegemonic leaders in military. Thus, present attempt focuses only on post 1999 military takeover unfolding of events as evidence for study.

II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

David Harvey notes in his book "A Brief History of Neoliberalism", "Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized through freedom of choice in choosing representation". The present study is operationalizing this concept as hegemonic power that asserts itself in matters related to policy making in various competing vested interests. A group of military bureaucrats who undertake many assignments as part of their 'professional work' tend to adopt the role of covert hegemonic leaders. (The DG ISPR briefing about execution of multiple tasks by military personnel in uniform). It is interesting to see the importance of actions of the military leaders after taking over government (Nordlinger, 1977). Usually two type of roles are assumed by such military leaders hold importance in this study.

One is 'Moderator of politics' and the second is 'director of political system (Štěpán, 1971). The first type is about military leaders achieving the specific objective like throwing out the incumbent ruling elite after takeover of a government by military leaders and publically committing to hold fresh elections and return to barracks. The focus on economic control over state resources under the guise of military industrial complex becomes core objective. As

consequence apparently military enters into market to achieve self-reliance and welfare projects of its large number of personnel.

The second role is about military leaders directly taking firm control of political system (Springborg, 2011) and penetrate into economic field through putting democratic façade by covertly facilitating new political party. It becomes continuous transmutation process because of corporatizing information production and means of opinion building of large masses. The political arrangements provide altogether different political resources to military leaders in order to control political system by favoring one and constraining rest of political machines or parties. Therefore, it becomes pertinent feature of duality of dialectical contradiction and unity that encompasses electoral politics in Pakistan's electoral history. Whereas recent electoral canvas shows that parties like Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) and Pakistan Tehreek i Insaf (PTI) in the last two elections depict that party politics is never consolidated on participatory grounds in the country due to hegemonic power manoeuvrings.

The flaws about consolidation of democratic participatory party politics result into inter party dialectical contradictions. It may be understood in the light of Hegelian dialectics where 'Nothing' moves through 'Becoming' to 'Being'. Thus the parties compete with each other to achieve status of 'Being'. So, as a consequence the hegemonic leaders with covert control over political mechanisms and rules push political elite of multiple-parties to engage into bargain to seek dialectical unity with hegemony. The hegemonic leadership manipulate influence over 'old school' politicians (Nordlinger, 1977) to perpetuate their control of hegemonic domination by facilitating one party to provide political support mechanism to the hegemonic group alongside a few other parties. The old school politician term may be understood through common educational and early professional experience. Additionally, it is important to understand that desire of political elite for prolonged electoral stability seeks electoral legitimacy formulas. There are four possible legitimacy formulas that hegemonic power structure adopts to construct authoritarian control over a population Linz and Linz (2000). These are charismatic legitimacy (Kim, 1992) formula, the corporatist non-party legitimacy formula, the single party legitimacy formula and the hegemonic party legitimacy formula. These are four categories that provide us to understand nature of party politics in any hybrid regime which tend to reinforce neo-colonization. The legitimacy formulas are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive because using one formula or a combination of different legitimacy formulas simultaneously might lead to a stable rule.

The hegemonic groups in Pakistan used charismatic populism since its inception in 1947 in the form of its founding leaders Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan under the garb of charisma continued even in the later political stages in Pakistan's electoral politics. Additionally, Cardenas of Mexico (Kim, 1992) used charismatic and populist leadership to achieve control by essentially instituted extensive corporatist arrangements to establish strong one party authoritarian regime during presidential tenure of 1934-40 (Kim, 1992). In case of South Korean military leaders who seized governmental power in 1961 (Kim, 1992) initially concentrated on devising hegemonic party formula. The result of such conditions under which hegemonic leadership implement particular legitimacy formula constantly appear in deepening of neo-liberal norms.

III.   VARIABLES OF HEGEMONIC POWER AND DIALECTICS OF POPULISM

The set of hypotheses are designed to help understand hegemonic power and party politics building process across hybrid regimes. It is an attempt to explain why political party fails to structure party politics with policy initiatives

to condition voter agency for active participation in policy formulation. The constitutional reforms politics could be elaborated to understand that how hegemonic power maneuvers to facilitate certain political party and constrain rest. The politics of constitutional amendments and law making has also been an effective arrangement to curtail political dominance of fluid dominant party. The recent wave of amendments in Pakistan constitution with reference to 18th, 19th, 20th and 23rd amendments are pertinent references (News, 2010). It is political field where struggle between political parties and covert hegemonic leaders occur. Therefore, emasculation of party leadership (Exile, legal litigation, and several incarcerating measures) and increasingly use of bureaucratic and coercive control of potential political opposition has been an important instrument of hegemonic leadership. The covert hegemonic leader's effective strategy to perpetuate influence over political parties has been time tested. In some of cases political engineering for fluid dominant party could be reduced to emergence of new party through range of maneuvering by covert hegemonic leadership. The factors above discussed explain how hegemonic power maneuver to facilitate specific political party and constrain other parties in party politics through manufacturing political choices. Thus party politics through manufacturing political choices and judgements in process leads to neo-colonization of party politics (Magaloni and Kricheli. 2010)

The following variables of hegemonic power explain to understand nature of party politics with focus on duality of dialectics of populism under neoliberalism.

DEGREE OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Party politics could not consolidate particularly when military leaders take over government and initiate hegemonic party building task. However quite large elite and masses find themselves alienated from party politics. Under hybrid regimes party competition is rent with factionalism and authoritarianism. The vigorous campaign against the prominent attributes of old school politicians result in the erosion of confidence in these politicians in particularly urban socio-political norms. This situation is maneuvered mostly by military leaders to capitalize on old school politicians for control. The election 2002 was evident of PMLN defections resulted into PMLQ under General Musharraf rule. Additionally the recent election in which large defections happened in favor of PTI particularly from PPP, PMLQ and even PMLN (Tariq, Usman, and Sajjad, 2015). The strong reason behind range of difficulties in complete eliminating network of parties from hybrid societies is old school politicians' personal mass following and continued connections with bureaucracy and business elite. This reason allows them to maintain support base in urban centers of power. The cause of liberal democracy is mostly popular among urban professionals and college/university students that could determine particular electoral outcome. The exclusionary and at some point of time inclusionary political strategies to maintain control over levers of power has been tried tested strategy in the hands of covert hegemonic leaders.

The excluded and exterminated old school politicians become opposition blocks as dissent evolves. These politicians' political asset is their networks of patronage (Piliavsky,2014) that connect masses with selective responsive state. But hegemony consolidates intelligence agencies role to tighten political coercion on partisan and electoral dissidents. The increasing coercive measures against opposition led to isolation of hegemony backed politicians and civil society. The divided opposition usually serves the political interest of king's party (Piliavsky,2014) but united

opposition could exert pressure on ruling king's party. The political engineering through constitutional and legal electoral reforms (Suleman, 2018) designed to perpetuate political domination of hegemony has also an instrument.

The formula for effective control over power needs larger vested interest groups incorporated with power arrangement by keeping small groups outside. But in Pakistan's case the vertical layers of networks remain critical to perpetuate power to the advantage of large body of political elite (Javid, 2012). Thus such peculiar condition has been working like ruder of duality in dialectics of contradiction and unity by hegemonic power.

DEGREE OF PARTY UNITY

Weak organizational internal unity leads to decline of political party possible dominance. It is important to investigate that how military elite and civilian elites integrate their interests under specific power arrangement (McCargo, 1998). There is always certain faction that has social ties with old college fellows and their anti-faction(s) that vie to grab power. The large factions have also smaller cohesive cliques that pursue their own immediate interest and therefore solidarity weakens sometimes. Nevertheless, few factions sharply contest over policy issues like ministerial portfolios allocation, party office positions, resources distribution, and succession of party leadership are few appear in political field. The previous PMLN government had intra-party friction among factions over close ties with hegemony (Peou, 2011). Similarly the incumbent PTI government has been in continuous shuffle and reshuffle in cabinet reflects intra-party factional friction (Samad, 2017). The particular advocacy and lobbying are major signs of such struggle. Sometimes party offices are given primacy over parliamentary members to implement policy preferences of party to politically elevate party among their support bases. The recent cabinet members complain about primacy of Prime Minister's principal secretaries in matters of meeting with Prime Minister. The Pakistan Tehreek i Insaf (PTI) PM's special advisor Naeem ul Haq may be good reference for clarification. Contrary to such practice sometimes certain faction contend that appointed party office holders cannot justifiably hold sway over elected members. So there is always pendulum like situation that sometimes strong party cadre formulate policies and in contrast sometimes strong parliamentary party give policies.

The factions in a party struggling either to support certain constitutional amendment or policy preference is actually political haggling that reinforces their hold over power. In effect opposing any legal amendment and policy preference to seek powerful position in a party is main field that remains under influence of hegemonic power actors. The fear of losing political clout and influence can also turn party into personal political machine (Loxbo, 2013). The government party rent with internal competition on the basis of competing political interests leads to purging of elements that challenge party leadership (Smyth, Lowry, and Wilkening, 2007). The forced exile or legal trials are common tools to distance popular founding members influence and government bringing under incumbent leader. There can be internal rule such like no-reelection and separation of party office and parliamentary membership that can prevent emergence of any dominant leader or faction. But these host of factors under hybrid regimes keep the party politics antagonistic that prepare conducive ground for hegemony to evade any challenge of mass mobilization challenge.

I. DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR POPULIST LEADERSHIP AND POLICIES

The central characteristics of populist leadership and distributional preferences are critical mass base (Smyth, Lowry, and Wilkening, 2007). support. Populism is indeed kind of appeal to people in anti-elitist way. The political discourse determines the potential of populist party in which mass following is achieved through party network and set

of maneuverings. The recent populist rhetoric of PTI on rising inequalities (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009) and corruption (malfunctioning of institutions) juxtapose political discourse about moral strength of leader is inevitable (Lakoff, 2010). The party hierarchy filled with highly qualified young civilian elite remains strategy to expand support base in favor of top leadership through populist sentiments (Storey, 1985). Populist leadership use party to his/her political advantages by demanding political discipline from followers, often employing coercive means to purge dissidents (Gorlizki, 2010). The populist notions are formulated in broad context of polity that build wider support base of party. If party is backed by urban middle class with focus on commercialization and pro-growth policies may be policy preference at the expense of [re]distribution centered policies. Rural voters' subscription to governmental authority apparatus is an established way of navigation to access state in everyday matters. Whereas urban/sub-urban voters tend to vote for parties that promise through corporate media campaign to influence political choices and performance judgements (Semetko et al, 2013). The important trend of massive urban migration and largely ignoring agro-production have also been contributing to quick unstable political party support. The economic growth confronts trade off like economic growth benefits limited to actors financing electoral campaign and multiple activities for political gain but large subordinate face exclusion from such benefits. This situation force populist leader to go with political expediencies for necessary control over levers of power (Alamdari, 2005). The campaign includes that certain party leader is indispensable for future and continuous progress. The long run urbanization and commercialization push accompanying social and cultural changes that could erode subject political culture, paternalism to translate into dominance of hegemonic power. The populist notion is handy to incorporate masses into party networks. The certain steps to win large sections support like providing employment to weak and marginalized sections has been solid instrument for populist politics (Robert and Stallings, 2007). The wider incorporation can be effective to represent multiple interests at different levels of party hierarchy from national to local level. So the response of party through party networks in the wake of increasing complex demands generated by development projects. The populist leadership build and carry on extensive patron-client machine to sustain dominant position. This outcome result into increasing power of covert hegemonic leaders at the expense of political leadership.

DEGREE OF STATE APPARATUS CONTROL BY PARTY

The control over state apparatus for dominance drive party to develop close relation with hegemonic power (governmental civil/military bureaucracy) due to dependence for political resources. Tension between party and administration over control of resources remains central feature. Party supremacy for political funding and elimination of administrative bureaucracy interference into party operation has been significant (Hope, 1985). Therefor the possibility of party being vulnerable to become handmaid of bureaucracy is quite common in hybrid regimes. Administrative bureaucracy tries that party and legislators not been able to control executive but to support their steps. How and who wants to promote influence of administrative bureaucracy, it is maintained that bureaucratic rationality preferred over political viability in policy formulation. The constitutional mechanism to control state apparatus through investigation of executive branch. Thus the interpellation (Krips, 2007) of political officials are usually weak in hybrid regimes because hegemonic power punish and sideline dissident elements. The consolidation of intelligence apparatus enhance control of partisan parliamentary politics (Levitsky & Way, 2007). The recent rise of state led foreign funded projects increase the role of state bureaucracy particularly military bureaucracy due to "deteriorated" security situation.

This has increased their role as intermediaries between foreign capital and local ruling elite. The foreign capital and technology has become integral part of economic program that push local capitalists to increasingly depend on state bureaucracy to maintain economic leverage. It is this pull factor that push all political parties to compete with each other and seek place in power corridors. The political and business elite close coordination under the umbrella of popular party increase the chances to achieve dialectical unity with hegemonic power as well. Thus parties' dependence on large financial resources for political funding are intertwined with administrative bureaucratic patronage networks (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006). Therefore, minor factions of party initially build alliance with administrative leaders to hold power position. In return administrative leaders favor on faction allow them to interfere in party policy choices because it reinforces power of hegemonic power under hybrid regime.

IV.   DISCUSSION

It can be briefly explained that political parties wield power through achieving dialectical unity with hegemonic power soon embarking upon policy choices that could further promote capital accumulation. However, alliance in hegemonic power and political party does not entertain the genuine demands of large masses' agency as primary policy preference (Clinton & Lewis, 2008). Therefore, it leads to new set of contradictions which again prepares ground for another political rhetoric. The parties outside power remain in dialectical contradiction that could be inter-party due to competition with each other. But this inter-party dialectical contradiction has another dimension of intra-party self-serving aspiration on the part of top elite to enter dialectical unity with hegemony at appropriate time. This is centuries old power compulsion of this part of world that it assumes means to end practice. This has given birth to a permanent cyclical set of political contradictions in overarching political system (Offe, 1994).

The history of Pakistan's elected Prime ministers, it began from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who tried to create institutional restraints on the military's power but failed because of his propensity to use the military prowess for political ambitions. The second instance of Mr. Bhutto's daughter Miss Benazir, whose two stints in PM ship twice in nineties. The desire to build consensus on security issues with the army failed, and dismissed her government on corruption accusations. (Gotten assassinated in 2007, shortly after returning from exile amid promises of amnesty) A final effort to rein in the military was attempted by Ms. Bhutto's husband Asif Zardari. It is only by acquiescing to the military that Mr. Zardari managed to serve out his five-year term, which many analysts have applauded as a resounding democratic success. But Mr. Zardari only stayed in office because he was unwilling to follow the same route of deceased wife and father-in- law. The problem with Mr. Zardari's strategy is that while it can buy longevity of government, it does not challenge the established order.

Later on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who served between Ms. Bhutto's two terms, and third time again. Every time Mr. Nawaz Sharif tried to rein in the armed forces' power by co-opting a few leading officers. But Mr. Nawaz Sharif removed quite few army chiefs, a coup was staged by Gen. Pervez Musharraf dissolved his government in 1999. Mr. Sharif returned to power through peaceful transition between two democratically elected governments. His approach with the military this time revealed again that culminated into Panama scandal. Finally he was deposed from his position and sent to jail.

The post 2002 election scenario explains political tactics of hegemonic power that led to party politics rapidly shrinking further narrowed due to hegemonic power forced defection. The Pakistan Peoples Party-Patriot (PPP-Patriot)

defection from mainland Punjab was delicate political maneuvering to the advantage of hegemonic power. This tactic of hegemonic power may be termed political maneuvering that facilitates dialectical unity for certain political party and constrains for the other. However, it has another long term effect for future electoral arrangement with political party that seems weak. Therefore, it prepared ground for further rise of PMLN in vast Punjab and assumed power in the provincial legislature in next electoral contest. Thus it created layered dialectical unity for different political forces as Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) at the center and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) in provincial legislature for cementing duality of dialectical contradiction and dialectical unity (Kurtz,1996). The larger structural shift of commercialization due to urbanization led to advanced form of capital accumulation produced adverse effects on the subordinate masses. Therefore, the high middle class and low income pushed into electoral rhetoric from hegemony in the form populist notion 'change' through newly formed political vehicle Pakistan Tehreek i Insaf (PTI). The populist notion flourishes due to lack of subjective independence that leads to political choices and judgements which result into perpetuation of powerful hegemony.

The charismatic leadership legitimacy formula promotes a charismatic leader to create a stable authoritarian regime, which depends upon a large number of people having faith in a leader's extraordinary qualities and capacities (Bendix, 1967). However, under this legitimacy formula a majority of population do not have to subscribe to leader's charisma. However, it is important to note that sizable number accepts his/her authority and the charismatic leader claims to carry out his mission of leading his country and people out of perceived troubles. The challenge of charismatic leader to establish a stable authoritarian regime leads to political manoeuvring. Therefore, a charismatic leader attempts to create an institutional set up usually in form of political party. Such examples could be found in Mexican Cardenas to build new party, Kemal of Turkey (Dogan, 2007), Franco of Spain (Payne, 2006), Nasser of Egypt (Mayfield, 2014), Peron of Argentina (Guy, 2016) and recently PMLQ under Musharraf (Yousaf, 2016) and PTI under Imran Khan (Wolf, 2018) of Pakistan.

The above-mentioned leaders used their charisma or its perception to forge new political institutions in form of political parties. The emergence of a charismatic leader is in most cases subject to specific circumstances like international or local regional conflicts or wars (Linz, Stepan & Linz, 1978). The military organization actually prevents emergence of charismatic leader particularly due to bureaucratic structure of authority based on seniority that demands corporate consensus. Consequently, these bureaucratic rules obstruct possibility of emergence of a charismatic leader.

In case of South Korea despite of Korean War, military had no charismatic leader to muster public support for an authoritarian regime. The rise of General Park Chung (Park, 1970) and Colonel Kim Jong-Pil staged military takeover in 1961 but they lacked any sign of popular charisma. Both gradually utilized political skills and qualities to inspire public admiration at wise scale. However, in case of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf had managed to instill public acceptance around nationalist-patriotism during and after the Kargil war (Gill, 2019) to justify the ouster of civilian government Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Many recognized and a few still recognize General Musharraf as a charismatic leader although there are multiple accounts.

The second legitimacy formula is about a corporatist arrangement through which military leaders reshape people's associational life into cohesive instrument of political domination (Siddiqa-Agha, 2003). The hegemonic leadership

supervision assures capitalists, labor unions, peasants, many occupational groups are organized and controlled in order to represent their (military's) particular interests (Grelle, 1995). These emerging interest groups have special prerogatives and quasi-representational monopolies (Bianchi, 1986) designed by the hegemonic leaders for these interest groups. The governmental authorities get the right to monitor activities of such sponsored or constructed interest groups. The set of machinations are maneuverings that tacitly discourage possibility of collective demand or action against the regime (Tarrow, 2013). The corporatist arrangements are essentially of two types, one is inclusionary and other is exclusionary. The inclusionary arrangements steer business associations, professional associations, and salient working-class groups (urban workers and rural peasants) are incorporated into authoritarian political process with maneuverings (Stepan, 2015).

The exclusionary corporatist arrangements dismantle and deactivate political groups through use of coercion. In Pakistan the political culture of militarization has been tool of exclusion opposition groups by procedurally creating uneven electoral field. The combination of corporatist ideology and political maneuvering with political institutions (parties) in legislature have been effective instrument of exclusionary corporatist arrangement. The General Musharraf implemented this method against M. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto in early 2000 soon after military take-over. The legal maneuvering through judicial trial and institutions like NAB (Siddiqa, 2019) (National Accountability Bureau) and NRB (National Reconstruction Bureau) were two major examples of these instruments. Usually, the corporatist political control of a hegemonic group often emerges where strong tradition of organic statism (Cammack, 1990) exists. Actually it provides the basis for emergence of interest groups' corporatist arrangements.

The concept of organic statism explains that components like individual, family, and private association have a function within organic whole (Štěpán, 1971). Therefore, organic statism plainly refutes individualistic democracy and substitutes it with some form of corporatist representation (Linz & Linz, 2000). The practice of organic democracy usually reconfigures process of political participation and could manipulate composition of representative legislature. South Korea does not inherit tradition of organic statism which Pakistan and many Latin American countries have inherited.

However, South Korea military leaders paid strategic attention to the elimination of interest group of teachers' unions who put up opposition to the military leaders. On the contrary military leaders paid strategic attention to the promotion of business associations and industrial labor unions (Choi, 2013). The weak potential of social mobilization in South Korea's interest groups held little political significance when military seized power in 1961. In Pakistan's case General Musharraf cultivated rising and socially upward mobile middle and low middle classes as interest groups (Mallick, 2017) in rapidly sub urban expansion in northern part of country, Pothohar region. The creation of Pakistan Muslim League Quaid i Azam (PMLQ) in crucial Punjab province and patronage of Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in urban Sindh by Musharraf regime exemplify institutional political maneuvering of corporatist arrangement formula (Grare, 2010).

The one-party framework is usually implemented by fascist or socialist leaders. Single parties are organized as well as led by hegemonic military leaders in many ways. The diverse factors like ideological strength, effective mobilization and degree of pervasiveness and intensity of coercive control are utilized by single party. The Eastern Europe witnessed hegemony of a single party that played main role in mass mobilization across the region (Janos,

2001). However, it is important to note that the single party under authoritarian regimes policy preferences lead to changes in the socio-economic life that had contributed in the downfall of single party rule in certain cases.

V. CONCLUSION

The election 2008 may be understood in the similar context that General Musharraf was engaged with Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to bargain for power share. In this process political truce was reached with PPP and got replaced General Musharraf with next elevating military General Ishfaq Kiani as Army Chief of Pakistan Army (Lieven, 2010). The election outcome on the electoral canvas showed that Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was able to form government at the center. Thereby, it was an evidence of their successful achievement of dialectical unity with hegemony at the center. However, this created layered dialectical unity of multiple political forces as PPP at the center and PMLN formed government in provincial legislature of crucial Punjab.

In short neoliberalism has been providing only suitable path for hybrid regimes of the developing world to close the gap with their former colonial powers. Where recent access to the latest goods and technology allows developing economies – with low levels of productivity – to boost productivity and output growth, and consequently incomes. Which has been propounded as main reason behind the logic the State should stay away from the economic sphere in the developing world. Because of weak democratic institutions would not successfully prevent the political sphere from capture by elites (Rahul, 2019).

Often, we see the military and its intelligence apparatus that have penetrated deep in most major political institutions of society, including political parties. Such as the case of Pakistan's military it may be seen as major player in real estate. The reported land scandals, involving senior generals and their families, have come to light, but have been brushed under the carpet (Siddiqa Siddiqa, 2013). For example, the country's main anti-corruption agency, the National Accountability Bureau, has been stymied in examining the railways department and a military logistics and supply company, reportedly because of intervention by senior army officers. Thus the disconnection between the military and the global capitalism economy is so severe that military commanders often fail to perceive how their actions undermine economic growth and development. In this reference understanding large orchestration in societies like Pakistan and Egypt, where military is the state's primary tool for exercising power in partnership with elites to control it, to eke out the benefits of power. Which allows military to use divide-and-conquer strategies to stymie potential political campaigning for reforms. Thus military's dominance is especially dangerous when it reaches into society, influencing the judiciary, political parties, academia, media and civil society organizations. This has lately happened in Pakistan as the army has shifted from brute force to soft coercion — bribing different constituencies into obedience resulting into neo-colonization of electoral politics. Therefore it is unlikely under prevailing political environment that genuine democratic government will emerge; instead hybrid regimes may likely to experience new form of "military-guided democracy," as has happened in Indonesia, Pakistan and other states. The tragedy of this pattern is clear because it allows the military to tame democracy, without being accountable to voters or being responsible for improving political governance. Pakistan's history also suggests (like Egypt's deposed president, Mr. Morsi) that prime ministers of Pakistan should have first created broad support for civilian rule by improving governance and economic performance before dismissing their defense minister or military top brass, the military's chief of staff and other senior officers. It is ironic in case of Egypt that the choice of defense minister, Gen. Abdul-

Fattah el-Sisi, ended up helping to spearhead the July 3 coup in Egypt. Thereby, in Pakistan's case the dismissal of many army chiefs by Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif began process of neo-colonization of electoral politics.

The political scientists Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Wein, authors of "Violence and Social Orders," would likely classify Egypt and other hybrid states as a "fragile natural state," where elite groups failed to arrive at a consensus rather than mutually advantageous self-serving behaviour. As a result, protests (Dharnas, Mass sit in) and political chaos ensue political elite groups' fierce competition for narrow individual control and profit maximization. Thus political parties looked down upon over the wider public interest as a result appearing instrument of neo-colonization of electoral politics under the dictates of hegemonic power. Therefore, in the age of neo-colonialism/neoliberalism all conduct in multiple spheres of human life is being framed and measured in economic terms and metrics. Additionally, neoliberalism is both operating as governing rationality and an economic policy prescription that is penetrating fast into every part of the world with neo-colonization of electoral politics (Xie, 2018). Therefore, successive 2002 to 2018 elections clearly depict cyclical dialectical contradiction and unity as well. It reflects that journey of past into present and present into past relationship which is operative at the root of dialectical contradiction and unity through the process of electocracy (Guinier, 2018).

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