

# Perceived negative activities: understanding the Nexus and mind set in our societies

<sup>1</sup>Clement Odiri OBAGBINOKO, <sup>2</sup>Abraham Ejogba ORHERO, <sup>3</sup>Vincent Eseoghene EFEBEH

## **Abstract**

*As the twin phenomena of organized crime and terrorism continue to threaten global peace, the search for effective ways of dealing with them has continued to engage the attention of scholars in the field of conflict and conflict resolutions. The paper identifies and discusses the distinguishing and common features of organized crime and terrorism and the factors that engender these two lives and peace threatening phenomena. Essentially, the paper identifies the social movement and deprivation theories as to the basis of the rising incidence of organized crime and terrorism and the pervasive and profound role politics and religion play in determining the activities and membership of organized crime and terrorism. Also, the paper identifies the three categories of persons who are potential members of organized crime and terrorism and the factor of their mind-set as a motivating factor. The paper thinks that despite the features that distinguish organized crime from terrorism, there exists a point of convergence between the two phenomena in their modus operandi.*

**Keywords:** *Organized crime, Terrorism, Social Movements, Nexus, Point of convergence.*

## **I. Introduction**

The distinction between organized crime and terrorism have always not been in doubt, rather, it has always been taken as given that there is a sharp division between the two concepts. (Laqueur,1999). However, recent events and incidents have shown that the fault line separating the two – terrorism and organized crime - has become increasingly blurred; this is to the extent that studies of the actual or potential convergence between terrorist activities and organized crime have become a growing trend within the geopolitical framework of the 20th century (Makarenko 2004,129-145). Two factors are critical and may be responsible for this convergence. First is that the increase in anti-terrorist laws and the global distaste for terrorism and terrorist acts following the 9/11 incident have drastically reduced states' willingness to sponsor terrorist acts and groups to some extent and hence drastically reduced their sources of funds and means of financing their operations. In addition to this, the globalization of the world economy, which has led to the emergence of a transnational form of organized criminality and money

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<sup>1</sup>Political Science Department, Delta State University, Abraka.

<sup>2</sup>Political Science Department, Delta State University, Abraka.

<sup>3</sup>Political Science Department, Delta State University, Abraka.

laundering, has eased considerably the possibilities of terrorists becoming involved in illegal businesses and money laundering (Sanderson, 2004, 49–61).

Both organized crime and terrorism are quick to exploit and thrive through the various opportunities presented by globalization and the growing economic interdependence, improved communication and information, technologies, the increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries and the emergence of a globalised economy to move crime and terrorism further from their bases. As Violante (2000) has noted, “money, goods and people have circulated with a rapidity and facility which were once unthinkable” and organized crime and terrorism have been quick to follow the trail laid by this movement. As the world has witnessed, terrorist activities and the emergence of various cells or clones from the ‘mother lode’ Al Qaeda, are increasing their scope of actions and operations, range of capabilities and are undergoing profound change (Agara et al 2017). The same can be said for organized crime (Godson and Olson 1995, 19). The deteriorating political order and political stability of many developing countries have equally led to a growing underground economy that habituates people to working outside the states’ legal frameworks. The easy access to small arms, the massive flow of emigrants, and the normal difficulties involved in accompanying meaningful international cooperation are working in favour of criminal organisations and terrorist groups. This type of environment gives impetus and even encourage "the rise of better organized internationally-based criminal groups (and terrorist groups also) with vast financial resources at their disposal to create new threats to the stability and security of the international system" (Godson and Olson 1995, p. 19). As the INTERPOL (2003, p. 17) had stated, "many international and transnational criminal organisations are continuing to expand their networks and links with other criminal organisations throughout the world, allowing the larger organisations to become increasingly powerful, technically sophisticated and global in their approach." This same scenario also played out for terrorist groups who have attained international status. Although terrorism and organized crime may differ in their goals, they nevertheless share a style of organization, geography, and overlapping membership and techniques. This paper is an empirical and theoretical construct.

## **II. Theoretical Postulations**

This paper will anchor its theoretical trajectories and postulations on two related theoretical frameworks – social movements and relative deprivation. This is to concede that we see organized crime and terrorism as social movements by people who had suffered some form of deprivations but without means to express or give vents to their grievances or meet these deprived needs without resorting to extra-judicial or illegal means. Social movements are unique and distinct from other social forms primarily because they (1) exist outside of the institutional framework of everyday life, and (2) are in some way oriented towards a degree of social change (Hannigan, 1985, p. 437). As Barnes (1995, p. 151) has noted, social movements are conventionally distinguished from political parties and pressure groups because they operate, not as political parties and pressure groups do through politics, but by the direct mobilization of opposition to what goes on within the channels of politics. Thus, deriving from Wood and Jackson (1982) and as Harper (1993, p. 140) has put it "social movements are unconventional collectivities with

varying degrees of an organization that attempt to promote or prevent change.” The term 'collectivity' is preferred in the case of social movements instead of the common and familiar term 'group' basically because the former helps to emphasise and drive home a major characteristic of social movements, which is that they are only partly organised social phenomenon. Thus, by the word 'collectivity', the point is made that social movements are a collection of people which is not structured along any organizational line nor are they as structured as groups.

Gerlach and Hine (1970) have identified certain characteristics of social movements that make them different from other organisations. First is that they have 'segmental organizations' that compete for loyalties of adherents in what can be described as a multi-organisational field. Second is that social movements are characterized by face-to-face recruitment in small groups. The third is that members participation is usually motivated by a high level of commitment to the cause rather than by external rewards such as money or other extrinsic rewards. Fourth is that over time, a social movement develops ideologies that serve as a rallying point for mobilizing members and articulate their rationales, goals and causes. Fifth is that social movements need opposition, whether real or perceived, that will provide impetus, direction and external pressure that helps create and cement needed solidarity within the movement. In this case, both religious and political social movements seem to thrive on an image of an opposing evil and villain such as the government or other movements, ethnic or tribes that are opposed to their cause.

Ted Gurr's (1971, p. 13) relative deprivation thesis states that "the greater the discrepancy, however marginal, between what is sought and what seems attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result". He defined relative deprivation as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities" (p. 25). Scholars that favoured this explanation have argued that absolute deprivation is a motivating force that has led to the emergence of social movements (Toch, 1965; Fanon, 1968). In this case, absolute deprivation means the prevalence and presence of such situations as hunger, illness, and lack of safety and other material deprivations which bring people close to the minimal conditions of survival. The analysts sympathetic to this explanation have equally postulated that changes in objective social conditions such as extreme poverty and rises in the price of food are causes of collective behaviour and social movements. However, empirical evidence has shown that absolute deprivation has not usually produced social movements, especially in areas where such absolute deprivation is common. Also, empirical evidence has equally shown that even where social movements emerged, such movements are not directed at alleviating the absolute deprivation.

This had therefore led to a reformulation of this theory and the rejection of objective conditions or deprivations as an explanation for the origins of social movements. Rather, scholars such as Davies (1969) and Gurr (1970) have seen the need to argue that relative deprivation (subjective deprivation) and not absolute deprivation (objective deprivation) is what presents the social-psychological condition underlying the emergence of movements. Thus, relative deprivation exists when there is a significant gap between values expectation and value outcomes, or put in another way, between what people expect and what they get. This theory has to do with the subjective feelings of being deprived relative to what others have or what they expected to have. The import of this theory is the existence of a reference group which is the source of such expectation and against which the individuals deprived

can measure their levels of deprivation and expectation. This means that the feeling of deprivation comes when people compare their condition with the relevant categories of others.

Thus, relative deprivation provides answers to (1) why protest movements are often common during periods of sustained improvement in objective conditions (expectations rise faster) and (2) why people involved in movements are often not the most “objectively” deprived people (Harper, 1993, p. 146). Thus, “this approach focuses on the comparative deprivation between groups...groups can be reasonably well off in terms of wealth, power and prestige, yet still feel deprived relative to other groups. When this occurs, the underprivileged groups are likely to protest” (Wood and Jackson, 1982, p. 37). However, there is no sufficient evidence that this approach is supported by empirical findings. Deriving from studies from the 1960s, McPhail (1971, p. 106) has concluded that “there is considerable reason for rejecting the notion that relative deprivation and ensuing frustration ...is the root cause of rebellion”. This may be the case when instances from developed Western nations are investigated, but in Africa, there is ample evidence to support the fact that relative deprivation and the feelings of alienation it engendered has led to more conflicts than any other single cause (Agara, 2012, Francis, 2011, Furley, 1995). Notwithstanding, relative deprivation theory offers scholars some advantages in explaining the origins of social movements such as (1) it is conceptually clearer than older arguments about mass discontent, (2) it does not involve a derogatory view of participants as riff-raffs enraptured by the irrationalities of mob actions, (3) it is viewed as having some utility when combined with other approaches, but on its own, it is not seen as a necessary or complete explanation of the origins of social movements (Gurney and Tierney, 1982. Wood and Jackson, 1982).

### **III. The Nature of the Nexus/Convergence**

Although there is no generally accepted definition of organized crime, Cressey’s (1969, p. 319) definition was adopted and used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for many decades. Cressey’s defined organized crime as “any crime committed by a person occupying, in an established division of labour, a position designed for the commission of crimes providing that such division of labour includes at least one position for a corrupter, one position for a corruptee and one position for an enforcer.” A new definition was mooted at a 1998 international conference in Warsaw on the problem of organized crime as a “group activities of three or more persons, with hierarchical links or personal relationships, which permit their leaders to earn profits or control territories or markets, internal or foreign, using violence, intimidation, or corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy.”

On the other hand, terrorism has enjoyed such abundance of definitions that these have further obfuscated the real meaning of the concept, particularly following Laqueur’s (2003) recognition that there are “many terrorists” (narcotic, cyber, biological and internet). Just like organized crime, terrorism has had a long history of thought which informs and motivates the practice, dating back to antiquity. Hence, a single sentence definition may be inadequate to capture the concept. However, dating from antiquity is the philosophical justification from the periods of the ancient Greek philosophers Plato (429-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) who discussed the question and morality of tyrannicide (that is, the killing of a despotic or evil ruler) in the *Republic* and *Politics* respectively. Also

dating from antiquity is the association between terrorism and religion. Religious groups have been known to carry out terrorist acts, in particular, a group called the *Sicarii* made up of a highly organized religious sect, the Zealot, known for their anti-Roman struggle in Palestine (AD 66-73). However, it is with the French Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror (1792-94) that we can date the beginning of modern use of the word 'terrorism.'

Thus, as Pettiford and Harding (2010, p. 35) have noted, "it is with the 19<sup>th</sup> century that terrorism arrives first as a word, but then in what we might term 'recognisable' form." Laqueur (1979, p. 117) had noted that "from the turn of the century to the 1960s, terrorism (became) the preserve of nationalist-separatist social movements." But as Sinai (2010/2011, p. 2) has noted, the most fundamental starting point in terrorism studies is how to define it. While not wanting to join in the definitional polemics and controversies, we shall acknowledge that there are two types of definitions; academic and institutional definitions. An example of an institutional or official definition is the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition which sees terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". An example of an academic definition is that of Ganor (2005, p. 17), who defines it as "a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against a civilian to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious etc.)." He further explained that the use of 'deliberate' in targeting of civilians to achieve political objectives is what distinguishes a terrorist act from a purely guerrilla warfare where military targets are the major focus of their operations. The controversies in definition notwithstanding, for any definition of terrorism to be acceptable, it must, at least, include these six major elements; (1) the use of violence or threat of violence, (2) the existence of an organized group, (3) the intention of achieving a political objective, (4) the focus of violence must be a targeted audience that extends beyond the immediate victims who are often innocent civilians (usually account for as collateral damage), (5) in this case, the government can be either the perpetrator or the target, and finally, (6) it is a form of insurgency usually favoured by the weak (Lutz and Lutz 2008, p. 9).

The definitional confusions, notwithstanding, certain attributes of organized crime have been identified by Abadinsky (2010, p. 3) and it is against these that we shall compare terrorist organisations to draw out the convergence. As Abadinsky (2010, p. 3) has claimed, these "attributes provide a basis for determining if a particular group of criminals constitutes an organized crime and, therefore, needs to be approached in a way different from the way one would approach terrorists or groups of conventional criminals." Abadinsky (2010), therefore, identified the main attributes of organized crime as (1) no political goals, (2) hierarchical order, (3) has a limited or exclusive membership, (4) constitutes a unique culture, (5) perpetuates itself, (6) exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence, (7) monopolistic, and (8) governed by explicit rules and regulations. We shall examine each of these attributes against terrorist groups and look at the similarities.

**No political goals:** The primary goals of all organized criminal enterprise are to make money and plenty of it. This includes having the power which money gives but whose procurement is not limited by legal or moral

concerns. Criminals are not motivated by social doctrine, political beliefs or ideological considerations. If any at all, political involvement is to further secure political patronage by politicians, gain protection or immunity for its illegal activities. About terrorist groups, there is a need to make a distinction between political terrorism (that is, those groups that have political goals) and religious terrorism (whose concern is primarily eschatological). This distinction is important because for a terrorist action to qualify as being politically motivated, it must “challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties” (Kittrie, 1981, p. 300).

Thus, religiously motivated terrorism differs from its political motivated counterpart primarily because first, while political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the lifetimes of the perpetrators, religious terrorism outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. Second is that targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military values but rather they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness. Thirdly, the constant recourse to a 'god' to justify their action has the power of 'satanism' the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism 'godly' and their goal nobler than mere secular pursuits of political ends. As Juergensmeyer (2004, pp. 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of “perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war”. The effect of this, as he had also noted, is “not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles.”

Fourth is that the targets of religious terrorism and violence also tend to assume and acquire a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, the then US President, George Bush whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the 'religious image' of America's "righteous cause" as combating and bringing to an end the "absolute evil" of its enemies. Fifth, the 'divine' nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between 'good' and 'bad', 'truth' and 'evil', the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful resolution. Sixth, the spiritual dimension of the war makes it to go beyond the confines of human law and the ideal of morality. Society's law is subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existence or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here are that society's laws and limitations are of no relevance when one is obeying a higher 'divine' authority. Seventh and finally, the result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who oftentimes are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life (Agara and Ogwola, 2014).

Thus, criminal enterprise and religious terrorism share a similar affinity of 'political ness.' This is despite Ayatollah Khomeini's claim that "Islam is politics or it is nothing" (Lewis, 2003:7-8). However, experience has shown that a group with political or ideological goals may consider its mission accomplished and no longer relevant, but rather than disband, it can mutate or transform into an organized criminal group. Several examples abound of ex-militant groups and members transforming into criminal groups particularly when they find personal and pecuniary

goals outweighing ideology or political reasons and often drift across the amorphous divide between politics and organized crime.

**Hierarchical:** An organized criminal enterprise organizational structure does not follow the usual horizontal structure. Rather, it has a vertical power structure with the position of the leader delineated, with authority inherent in the position and not depending on who the occupant is at any given time.

**Limited or exclusive membership:** Membership into the organized group and terrorist organisations are never advertised or announced, nor are written applications invited with applicants shortlisted for interview. By their exclusivity, the membership is also exclusive, not open, but significantly limited with strict qualification or criteria such as ethnic background (as in the case of the Fulani Herdsmen who were predominantly of the Fulani stock (Ishaku, 2018)), kinship, race, criminal record, religious affiliation (particularly in the case of religious terrorism like the ISIS, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram). Apart from meeting the basic qualifications, potential members would also require to be sponsored by a high-ranking member of the group and must prove qualified by their willingness to perform any acts required of them, obey orders and keep secrets.

As Abadinsky (2010, p. 4) has noted, the attractiveness and appeal of such groups can be seen by the steady stream of and availability of recruits desiring membership and access to such organisations. In some groups, members are expected to go through some form of gruesome initiation rites. Although, in the case of ISIS, membership is a little less restricting with the influx of European non-Muslim youths joining the ranks and been recruited through the internet. However, their access is strictly limited to that of foot soldiers and may not be admitted to the higher echelon until such as proved their loyalty and commitment by carrying out certain atrocious actions that will show his level of commitment and loyalty to the cause. This is to guard against infiltration by secret agents of counter-terrorist groups. In both organisations, there are usually periods of apprenticeship which may range from several months to several years. In the case of terrorist organisations, this period is used in training the new members in the 'art of war' such as bomb-making, weapons training and the likes in camps located in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey and Pakistans, hilly and mountainous areas constantly bombed by allied drones led by the United States.

Of importance here is what Ben-Dor and Pedahzur (2005, p. 77) have called the 'totalistic' attribute of Islam. As a religion, Islam demands total adherence from its believers. Deriving from the above historical excursion, Islam could be seen not merely as a religion but as a total civilisation encompassing both the secular and the religious and every aspect of the life of the individual as well as the community. A Muslim in Saudi Arabia is deemed as one with any other Muslim from any other part of the world. The bonds that bind them all together are religion irrespective of nationalities. This makes it easier for Muslims to refer to their opponents not in territorial or national terms but simply as infidels (*kafirs*). Similarly, Muslims never referred to one another as Arabs or Pakistan or Nigerian, they simply identified themselves by their religion.

This perspective helps explain why, for instance, Pakistan is concerned with the Taliban and their successors in Afghanistan. That is why, for instance, the Taliban could fund religious insurrections and violence in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia would want to finance an Islamic bank in Nigeria. Conversely, an Afghanistan or Turk or

Nigerien identified by his religion would be a natural ally to a Muslim in Nigeria and other parts of the world. As Lewis (2003) has noted; "the very idea of such a grouping, based on religion, in the modern world may seem anachronistic and even absurd. It is neither anachronistic nor absurd about Islam." Thus, Islam is not only a matter of faith and practice, but it is also an identity and loyalty, for many, but it is also an identity and loyalty that transcend all others. While secular politics and religious piety are separated in other nations, in the Muslim nations, there is no such separation. Both religious truth and political power are indissolubly associated; the first sanctified the second, the second sustained the first.

***Constitutes a unique subculture:*** The terms 'underworld' and 'secret organisations' best captured the views of members which make them see themselves as distinct from the rest of the society. They often view members of the larger society with some derision and contempt because they see themselves as above it and hence, not subject to the rules and laws governing conduct within such societies. As Agara (2013) had earlier noted, religious terrorism differs greatly from secular terrorism basically because they are predicated on different value systems, mode of justification and legitimacy for their actions rests on a different concept of morality, belief systems and world view. While for the secular terrorist, terrorism becomes a means to an end, for the religious terrorist, terrorism is an end in itself. Violence, therefore, becomes a sacred instrument or means to achieve a divine duty in response to a divine imperative. They are not guided by any man-imposed political or social imperatives, but see their acts as a sacramental duty with transcendental dimension expedients for the attainment of their goals.

This explains in part why religiously motivated acts of terrorism are more intense and claim more fatalities than the less relatively more discriminating violence perpetrated secular terrorists. Guided by a perception that sees themselves; that is, religious terrorists, not as 'insiders' or members of the system, but as 'outsiders' seeking to effect fundamental changes in the existing order along certain doctrinal lines, the religious terrorist has a high sense of responsibility coupled with a sense of alienation that enables him to distance himself from the victims of his atrocities and thus able to contemplate ever more destructive means of expressing his dastardly acts. This explains the rhetoric common in the vocabulary of such demagogues denigrating and dehumanising their victims in terms such as 'infidels,' 'dogs,' 'children of satan,' and many others. The deliberate use of such terms not only justify the acts of violence since the victims are not seen or regarded as human beings but also justifies and erodes very form of constraints on violence and emboldens the perpetrators.

***Perpetuates itself:*** Both organized crime and terrorist organizations constitute a conspiracy designed to persist through time and even after and beyond the lifetimes of their founders and present members. It is this aura of persistence and permanence that provides the attraction and an important basis for attracting memberships to the groups and hence perpetuating its continued existence. Cressey (1969, p. 263) has noted concerning organized crime that for it to survive, it must have "an institutionalized process for inducting new members and inculcating in them the values and ways of behaviour of the social system." The same can be said of terrorist organisations. As Agara et al (2017) have noted, "while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) may be credited with the internationalization of politically-motivated terrorism, at least the ethnonational political dimension of it, the Al Qaeda could be credited with internationalizing the religious dimension."

Today, the emergence of many 'al-Qaedas' has made religious terrorism a vast enterprise, "an international movement or franchise operation with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base, but advancing their common goal independently of one another" (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 2005-2006). Al-Qaeda is reportedly to have 'cells;' operational bases in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia and the West Bank and Gaza in Palestinian areas of Israel (Perlmutter, 2004).

***Willingness to use illegal violence:*** A distinguishing factor of both organized crime and terrorist groups is their willingness to use violence in pursuit of their goals. Their use of violence is not restricted by a moral or ethical consideration but is controlled only by practical limitations. In Islamic religious terrorism, violence is believed to be an integral aspect of its fundamentalism. As Agara and Ogwola (2014) have noted, according to the Muslim tradition, the world is divided into two houses; the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*) and the House of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*). In the House of Islam where Muslim governments rule by Islamic laws and principles, there is no need for jihad, but in the House of War where the world is still ruled and governed by infidels, then jihad becomes an imperative and an obligation. The presumption here is that jihad becomes a continuous duty until the whole world has accepted the Muslim faith.

An emerging dimension to the use of violence is the inclusion of female terrorists and the recourse to suicide bombings. Elsewhere, we have fully interrogated these twin phenomena (Agara, 2015, 2016 and Agara and Onimawo, 2018). One of the tragic aspects of modern terrorism but which seems to be gaining grounds in popularity is suicide bombers. Going by the numbers of successful operations and the dexterity of the bombers, it would seem that the Boko Haram religious terrorists in Nigeria especially favoured this type of technique. However, the modern-day phenomenon of suicide bombers has its root in the earlier version of the use of assassins who constituted a religious sect in Islam. Suicide is easy to conceptualise as the willful and deliberate taking of one's life as a result of some perceived reason or cause, what Gere (2007, p. 363) has called "homicidal self-sacrifice."

According to *Jane's Intelligence Review*, "suicide terrorism is the readiness to sacrifice one's life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal. The aim of the psychologically and physically war-trained terrorist is to die while destroying the enemy target." As Gere (2007, p. 363) had pointed out, the use of suicide bombers occur in two contexts: in declared open war in which regular combatants are involved, targeting other uniformed enemy soldiers, equipment and installation; and in undeclared conflicts which can be civil, ethnic or religious. Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between wartime suicide operations made popular by the Japanese kamikaze during World War II and terrorist suicide operations such as those carried out by Palestinian Islamist organisations and made more desirable by Al Qaeda. Patkin (2007, p. 170) has defined suicide bombing as "a bomb attack on people or property, delivered by a person who knows the explosion will cause his or her death."

The irony of female suicide bombers is that in radical Islam, women's status as subordinate is fundamental and rigorously maintained; they are considered as unclean, they must be kept hidden and their bodies covered and made subordinate to men (Elshtain, 2003), so the few that have bridged the societal norms by appearing in public are better used as cannon fodder, explosive baggage or a suicide bomber. It is a general irony to note that the leaders of terrorist movements who urge other to give their lives in pursuit of the goal of the movement usually have their children not been involved in suicide missions but kept far away from the trauma and danger of the intifada. The female suicide bomber becomes a victim in the midst of what she considers the most empowering act of her life; even at death, she cannot escape from the stigma of her sex as a woman imposes on her by the religion which now places demands on her life. Thus, in a society that restricts options and opportunities available for women, where children at an early age are socialised into terror and where martyrs attain the status of celebrities, where daily life is fraught with endless examples of humiliation and deprivation in a culture where honour has historically been among the most salient values, where religious leaders provide the most elaborate theological justification for martyrdom, it should be no surprise then that there will be endless volunteers among young people, both male and female, for martyrdom.

**Monopolistic:** Every criminal organization lays claim to particular territories to which it eschews competition but rather establish hegemonic control over that territory. This hegemony could be over a metropolitan area or section, a particular 'industry' (such as gambling, trucking, drug, prostitution, protection racketing or/and loansharking or a combination of these). This monopoly is maintained and sustained through violence or by the threat of violence or through corrupt relationships with government officials. The hegemony is enforced by the use of both methods – violence and support by corrupt officials. Because of the existence of opposing groups interested in carving into the territorial claims of other groups, violence becomes an unending possibility. However, territoriality is more closely associated with localness rather than the broad reach of transnational criminal organisations (Reuter and Petrie 1999).

In the case of political terrorist organisations, similar concerns of territoriality are important. Such groups always operate within a defined territory or geographical area where their influence and political goals can be realized. But for religious terrorism, the 9/11 incidents have internationalized them and so are transnational with 'cells' in virtually all areas of the globe. bin Laden's declaration of jihad against the United States in 1998 through a fatwa, calling on all Muslims to "kill Americans, military and civilian and plunder their money" (Migaux 2007, p. 315), has led to the creation of many networks and extremist movements in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kuwait and even in far remote areas such as Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and other countries. These various networks were able to draw inspirations from Al Qaeda's activities, and by so doing justified their local actions as belonging to a worldwide body of insurrections against infidels (Agara et al, 2017). In Nigeria, for instance, the Taliban (students of religion) connection to many of the religious terrorists' attacks has not been denied.

**Governed by rule and regulations:** Like all legitimate multi-layered organizations, organized crime is governed by a set of rules that regulate the behaviour of its members. Contravening any of these rules may lead to an outright death sentence, or as Abadinsky (2010, p. 5) puts it, "a rule-violating member is not fired but, more likely,

fired upon.” Among terrorist groups, similar rules and regulations exist which inspired a code of silence and denial even under torture. However, a way of ensuring this silence is that information is shared on the ‘need to know basis’ only. Information is shared only at the segmented level where no one operative or person has the full information except the leader and perhaps a few trusted lieutenants. Thus, each operative knows in part (only the aspect of the operation that concerns him or his cell) and not in full. This is assured by the cell organizational structure they adopted which further enhances security by providing a degree of separation between the leadership and the operatives

#### **IV. Understanding the Mind-set**

Several questions have always been asked concerning the mindset of terrorists in particular. What kind of person becomes a terrorist? Conversely, what kind of people cherish organized criminality? What kind of people are predisposed to the destruction and killing of other people? Are they religious fanatics or ideologues? Are there any indicators to tell who is likely to become a terrorist? All these questions apply to members of organized crime. In particular, the last question concerns the attempt by psychologists and sociologists to identify the traits most commonly related to willingness to either join or become a terrorist or member of an organized crime syndicate. It is believed that if these traits can be identified, it then becomes possible to predict, identify, understand and hence prevent memberships into these groups.

Hacker (1976, p. 8-9) has identified three categories of persons generally thought of as potential members of organised crime or terrorist groups. They are the “crazies, criminals and crusaders.” According to him, the ‘crazies’ “are emotionally disturbed individuals who are driven to commit acts generally associated with criminality and terrorism by reasons of their own that often do not make sense to anybody else.” The ‘criminals’ “perform acts for more easily understood reasons: personal gains.” These transgressed the law of the society being in full control of their faculties and senses and both their motives and goals for doing so can be clearly understood by everybody even though it is deplorable to us. The ‘crusaders’ commit terrorist acts because they “seek not personal gain, but prestige and power for a collective cause.” Like the ‘crazies’ their reasons for doing this are often unclear both to themselves and others, their ultimate goals are even frequently less understandable. They commit these acts because they believe that they are serving a higher cause.

The basic difference in the mindsets of these three types is very clear. For instance, the criminal does what he does with anticipation that he will live to enjoy the reward of his illegality whereas, the crusader will be more willing to blow himself up along with his targets or victims because their service carries the assurance of a greater reward in the hereafter. The crusader is always a well trained professional, disciplined, obedient and committed to the cause. Crusaders are not willing to negotiate any resolution because such action is viewed as a betrayal of the cause and there is little the negotiator can offer because the crusader does not desire any personal gain or a safe passage out of the situation. Their belief in the cause and justification of their action makes death not a penalty but a path to glory and a greater reward than can be offered here on earth by either the negotiator or government.

The search for a terrorist/criminal personality or mindset that would act as a common denominator is legitimate but may prove futile. However, this has not dissuaded profilers from embarking on this journey. As it relates to terrorists, O'Ballance (1979, pp. 300-301) has offered one of such profiles, by identifying certain characteristics such as (1) Dedication which implies being a 'fedayeen', a man willing and ready to sacrifice everything for the cause. The dedication also implies absolute obedience to the leader of the group. To some extent, this characteristic may also be found among criminals only that most would not be ready to sacrifice everything. Among criminals, the option of plea bargaining has provided a soft landing for those who are ready to negotiate and betray others. (2) Personal bravery which includes the possibility of death, injury, imprisonment or even tortured. Among hardened criminals, similar traits can be seen. (3) Devoid of human emotions of pity or remorse. This is necessary because most of the victims of terrorist attacks are made up of innocent victims; men, women and children, who are not in any way related to the cause but who he must be prepared to kill without hesitation in pursuit of the cause. Of course, similar traits can be seen even among criminals. (4) Fairly high standard of intelligence. As have been noted, many recruits into the terrorist group have above average western education. The leader of Boko Haram was a university graduate and Osama Bin Laden was an engineer trained by the Americans. This is necessary because they are expected to "collect, collate and assess information, devise and put into effect complex plans and evade police, security forces and other hostile forces" (Combs, 2003, p. 56). (5) The fairly high degree of sophistication. This is particularly essential because terrorists are expected to mingle with the most sophisticated crowd without standing out. (6) Be reasonably well educated and possess a fair share of general knowledge. Characteristics 4,5, and 6 are exhibited by members of organized crime, particularly in this age where fairly large numbers of the memberships are unemployed graduates with access to the internet and other social media.

## V. Conclusion

This paper has been limited to only two aspects of convergence; the structural attributes and mindsets of members of these two organisations. However, areas, where the convergence is more explicit, are mostly in the methods of their operations such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, illegal trading activities, theft and armed banditry, forgery and forging of documents, extortion for protection and creation of front or screen companies to launder money (de la Corte 2013, del la Corte and Gimenez-Salinas 2013 and Gomez 2010). Going by what Abadinsky (2010, p. 5) has noted that "in some cases, the terrorists imitate the organized criminal behaviour they see around them, borrowing techniques," and this has led to more intimate connections, particularly in places where both groups exist together and in geographical areas riddled with poor governance, ethnic separatism, and/or where a tradition of criminal activity is prevalent such as in failed states, war regions, prisons and some urban neighbourhoods (Shelley and Picarelli 2005).

However, this is not to argue that there are still no areas of divergence, but to show that once terrorists and other criminal elements start to collaborate and cooperate, buying and selling goods from each other, they eventually share each other's goals as well as operational methods. In such a situation, the society, state, region is in great

danger and insecurity becomes an issue and greatly compromised. Nigeria is facing a situation where criminal Fulani Herdsmen and Boko Haram are so into each other that it is even difficult for security agencies to identify which is which anymore.

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