Security imperatives and societal implications for government: Perspectives in Nigeria

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Abstract:

In the first half of the year 2020, Nigeria had recorded intensified violence spawn from the insurgent groups in the form of Boko Haram Islamic sect, Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP), banditry and the self-styled Fulani herdsmen attacks in the North East, North West, and now in other regions of the country. These seemingly intensified and determined campaign of violence by these insurgent groups, and the ineptitudes of the Security Chiefs to contain the activities of these terrorists groups and criminal gangs, as well as the occasional violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law, inarguably, resulted to the regular outcries for the protection of lives and properties, as well as the removal of the Security Service Chiefs in the country. This study, therefore, seeks to unveil the reasons behind the activities of these insurgent groups and the consequences of their actions to socio-economic development of the country. Also of pertinence is the need to x-ray the trends in attacks by the insurgents and criminal gangs. To achieve the objectives of this study, historical research design which is qualitative and explorative in nature was adopted. This means that data used were derived mainly from secondary source such as textbooks, journal publications, official documents, internet materials, among others. The study adopts Expectancy theory to examine the need for the government and security agencies to ensure the citizens are protected, and not particularly, the regime. Policy options were proffered to ameliorate the consequences of the activities of the insurgent groups and to strengthen the security agencies, especially the armed forces to enable them combat these insurgencies in the country. Moreover, the government needs to improve on border security to stem the inflow of jihadist groups, small and light weapons through the country's porous borders with its neighbouring countries; and also on the forestry department in order to check the movement of these criminal groups who find our forests as safe for camping and training of their recruited members, among others.

Keywords: Nigeria, citizens, Citizens Security, Regime Security, Security Service Chiefs.

I. Introduction

Security has always been one of the functions of a state. Undeniably, the concept of security evolved as state system evolved. Several theories of the origin of state emphasised the need for security of lives and peaceful

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coexistence of the individual in a society. Specifically, the *social contract theory* or rather *Thomas Hobbes' social contract* posits that the individuals willing surrendered their rights to the sovereign (a constituted authority) with the hope of getting security and other necessity of life in return (Sikiru, 2013:61). Unfortunately, the seemingly unending security challenges in Nigeria contradict this notion. The unending security problems in the country, however, have led to loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and properties, as well as the drastic drop in foreign direct investment, FDI and national development, occasioned by the activities of insurgent groups and criminal gangs in the form of Boko Haram Islamic terrorist organisation, ISWAP, banditry, armed robbery, and most importantly, the self-styled Fulani herdsmen attacks in the North West; and other regions of the country, as well as the incessant disregards of human dignities by the security personnel and the insurgent groups alike, have attracted national and international concerns in recent times. Most worrisome, is the regular trends of behaviour, actions and tactics adopted by the insurgent groups in orchestrating violence in the country, and the seemingly regime security approach (pattern of actions) by the security chiefs towards the fight against these forms of security challenges over the years. Obviously, the regime is protected while the masses that are in the majority are exposed to the attacks from the insurgent groups in the country. These have raised a lot of criticisms and several calls for the removal or dismissal of the security chiefs in the country by the citizens, some of whom have alleged complacencies on the part of the Security Chiefs and their subordinates in recent times.

These security challenges, unfortunately, have propelled Nigeria to the centre stage as one of the most volatile and unsafe nations in Africa in particular and the world in general alongside some of its Africa counterparts and the Middle East. In the past decades, Nigerians have had to contend with quite a few deadly security problems such as armed robbery, political or election violence, inter and intra-ethnic crises, boundary disputes, militancy in the Niger Delta region and secessionist movement in the forms of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South East. But the emergence of the global radical Islamic jihad movement led by the AL-Qaeda terrorist organisation (AQTO) and now its affiliate groups has changed the contours of security challenges in the country with Boko Haram, ISWA, banditry and herders attacks as the major security challenges in recent years. Logically, these insurgent groups that have found *safe haven* in northern Nigeria seem to have been demonstrating their loyalties and commitments to the global jihadist movement, and at the same time, transferring their grievances to the Nigerian state and her citizens regarded as *infidels*.

Alozieuwa (2012:2) argued that the Boko Haram insurgency in north eastern Nigeria has intensified its activities after the death of its spiritual leader, Muhammed Yusuf in 2009 and since then has given birth to other affiliate and splitter groups as it strives to actualise its mandate which is to establish Apo-state in northern Nigeria through the combined efforts of both external and local groups and individual sponsors. However, the apparent inability of the Security Chiefs to contain the activities of Islamic extremism of the Boko Haram, ISWAP, and criminal bandits and Fulani herdsmen attacks on sedentary farmers and innocent citizens, has attracted condemnations from the general public, foreign governments and international organisations, and most significantly, President Muhammadu Buhari. In his recent effort to restore public confidence in his administration's capability to protect lives and properties, which has been under severe criticisms, Buhari reprimanded the Security Chiefs, "saying no more excuses for insecurity in the country" (Deji & Omololu, 2020).

II.   The Nature of the Problem:

Undoubtedly, the Federal Republic of Nigeria whose commitment to regional integration, and peace and security in Africa which commendable is now taunted by uncontrollable attacks from internal security challenges occasioned by the activities of terrorist organisations, bandits and Fulani herders in recent times. There are, however, no doubt that Nigeria currently is convulsing from numerous conspiratorial and contradictory security challenges and the inability of the successive Security Chiefs to manage, resolve or combat Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and Fulani herdsmen insurgencies. Most sympathetic is that the regime or the officials of government of the federation and security service chiefs are protected while the masses who are in the majority are victims of attacks from the nihilists of the Boko Haram sect, ISWAP, bandits, and other criminal gangs. This has also given birth to the issues of mistrust and lack of confidence in the security networks and the security chiefs in recent times, leading to the calls for dismissal of the current security service chiefs handling the fight against the insurgent groups in the country.

Then, the questions remain: why are the security chiefs unable to confront these security challenges to the admiration of the Nigerian citizens? Does it mean that the security agencies are underfunded and ill equipped to confront these security issues in the country? Does it mean that the removal of the security chiefs would resolve the problem of insecurity in the country? This study, therefore, intends to unveil the reasons behind these emerging security challenges; and if there is need to sack the Security Chiefs involved in the fight against these emerging security threats to lives and properties of the Nigeria's citizens, national unity, as well as peace and security of the nation.

1.   Objectives of the Study:

The broad objective of this study is to examine the trend in regime security and citizens' security in Nigeria with a focus on the recent calls for the removal of the security service chiefs. While the specific objectives are to:

i.   Identify the reasons behind the emerging security threats and trends analysis of the Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and Fulani herdsmen insurgent groups in Nigeria.

ii.   Ascertain or examine if there is need to sack the security service chiefs in the country.

iii.   Proffer useful policy options that will ameliorate the activities of these insurgent groups rather than the call for the sack of the Security Service Chiefs.

2.   Research Question:

This study addresses the following research questions:

i.   What are the reasons behind the emerging security challenges and trends analysis of the Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and Fulani herdsmen insurgencies in Nigeria?

ii.   Is it necessary to sack the Security Service Chiefs following public outcries for their dismissal?

iii.   What are the policy options that are likely to ameliorate the activities of these insurgent groups rather than the calls for the sack of the Security Service Chiefs in the country?

3.   Method of the Study:

In this study, historical research design was reliably adopted. Historical research design is used to collect, verify and synthesize evidence from the past to establish facts that defend or refute issues raised in a study in any subject area. In a nut shell, the instrument used in sourcing for data is the Secondary source. Secondary source of data help a researcher to review literature relevant in his study area and within the literature that have existed and related to the topic under study. However, the relevant data for the study were sourced from textbooks, journal publications, official documents, internet materials, among others.

4.   Theoretical Framework:

This study adopts *Victor. H. Vroom's Expectancy theory or simply Expectancy theory of motivation, 1964* to examine the link between regime security, citizen's security and the outcry for the removal of the Security Service Chiefs in Nigeria. This theory emphasises the reason an individual or group of individuals behave or act in a certain way or manner, especially when faced with some challenging circumstances or motivated to select a specific behaviour over others because of what they expected from the environment. It is also about the mental processes regarding choice, or that which explain the processes an individual or group of individuals undergo to make choices. When situated to an organisation, the theory explains the needs for an organisation to relate rewards to performance and to ensure that rewards provided are what are desired by the recipient(s) (Oliver, 1974; Montana and Charnov, 2008).

As part of the motivation theory in business management or organisational management, Vroom's Expectancy theory focuses on the driving force behind all human efforts and is essential to all human achievements, therefore, occupy a very important place in any given environment or situation. Since motivation is essential in any business organisation, it is equally necessary whether in a private or public enterprise or any social organisation. Parijat and Bagga (2014:1) identified four (4) variables of *motivation* that maters to an employee(s) to include: individual effort, individual performance, organisational rewards/work outcomes, and personal goals. In essence, expectancy theory works in various ways such that an employee or employees have personal goals which he/they would like to achieve but this can only be fulfilled by organisational rewards or outcomes. Secondly, rewards or work outcomes are dependent on the individual performance of the employee(s) and his/her belief in the organisation. Thirdly, the perception of the individual employee over his/her efforts towards the organisational goal is all necessary since this is likely to promote high performance (Parijat & Bagga, 2014).

This implies that as much as an organisation expects optimal performance from employees, so the employees in return expect reward or praises from the employer which would encourage maximum performance and stable working relations or environment for both the organisations and employees. In other words, much as the Federal Government of Nigeria (the Presidency) expects optimal performance from the Security Service Chiefs (SSCs), so much are also expected from the Government in return. For example the Central Government is expected to provide the security agencies all that are required (such as funding, technical support, logistics and equipments) to enable them perform optimally to the expectations of the government and the general public without which is low performance from the security agencies in combating the surge of insecurity in the country.

By implication, *the Central Government, State Governments, the SSCs, security agencies and the civilian population* are expected to synergise in order to achieve a unified goal which is to put an end to the rising rate of insecurity occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorism, herders/farmers conflict, bandits, kidnappers, armed robbers, and other forms of security challenges in the country. In other words, the government and the general public should not *expect much* to be done or achieved by the SSCs and their agencies without their maximum inputs or collective contributions to the success of the security agencies to combating insecurity in the country. This is what expectancy theory connotes in this study.

III.   Review of Related Literature:

1.   The Concept of Regime Security

The rise in violent extremism, transnational terrorism and other forms of crimes in recent years has added to a shift in both domestic and international security arrangements. There is also a regime of proliferation of peace and security arrangement in Nigeria following the recent trend in domestic disturbances of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, ISWAP, bandits, Fulani herders and farmers' conflict, and other forms of security challenges. Although, the rate at which these forms of security challenges are managed in Nigeria raised a lot of perturbing questions as to whether the security of lives and properties is paramount and only meant for the regime (i.e. the government or those in positions of authorities) or for the citizenries of the state irrespective of social status and locations.

The concept "*Security regime*" has been used in interpreting the seemingly one sided security situation in Nigeria. In recent time, the country's security programmes and policies have been defined in terms of the protection of the regime and the security service chiefs. This means that citizens' security which is part of human security seems to be compromised and in favour of the members of the regime and the security service chief. Rather than broadening the perspectives to the interpretation of citizens' security which include security of lives and properties, as well as food and environmental protection, etc., the concept of security has been narrowly interpreted in Nigeria due to the rate at which the common man in the street of Nigeria state, especially in the north east and north west regions, is exposed to violent attacks from criminal gangs while those in position of authorities and the security service chiefs are often protected.

In the face of the security challenges in Nigeria, the term security has gone through several conceptual interpretations, that is, from protection of lives and properties on the one hand, and food security, provision of social infrastructure and environmental protections on the other hand. Some scholars and critics alike have erroneously conceived the concept of security to mean regime security. While some centre their definition of security on regime protection, i.e. the protection of those in position of authorities only and not for the people and the community, others see it as the protection of lives, properties and the provisions of food and shelter to the people and not for members of the regime only. Regime security in this context is what we perceived to be one sided because those occupying positions of authority and the security service chiefs seems to be secured and fully protected from attacks from these criminal gangs while the average Nigerian citizen is exposed to sundry attacks from the criminal gangs of

the Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits, herdsmen, armed robbers, and among others. In a nut shell, it is a common belief that the state, those in positions of authority, security service chiefs and the common man in the street of Nigeria are expected to be protected by the government and its security agencies without reservations. This brings us to the belief in citizens' security and not regime security.

According to Hendricks and Keita (2017:1) the term "*Security regime*" was first applied to security by Robert Jervis in 1982, who defined the concept as the "*principles, rules and norms that allow nations to control or restrain their behaviours and that of the citizens*". They have argued that the concept in recent times has been expanded in conceptualisation, nature and function to include domestic, regional, sub regional and international security arrangements. It has also taken formal and informal institutional arrangements as evidenced in the UN Security Council (UNSC) framework, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU), and other forms of arrangements such as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), etc. It has also been expanded to issue areas such as arms race, illicit drug trafficking, violent extremism, and other forms of regional security mechanism such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established to combat Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin (Hendricks & Keita, 2017:2).

In the words of Beasley (2009) *regime security* explains why some states decide to develop nuclear weapons but fail to account for their behaviour. He argued that some domestic regimes of the twenty-first (21st) century states, though, with no clear strategic threat, develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure their survival and balances in the international system despite being under increasing pressure from domestic instability or insecurity challenges. Under normal circumstance, such regimes are isolated due to intense pressure from the citizens and the super powers in the international system. Amazingly, such regimes believe that that the pursuit of nuclear weapon regime would make the super powers to want to favour them and maintain status quo (Beasley, 2009). We conceive the Nigeria's regime security in a like manner with this form of security arrangement leading to the recent outcry for the removal of the security service chiefs.

2.   The Concept of Citizens Security and Insecurity

Many developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in recent times face alarming and intense pressure from Islamic extremists, transnational terrorism and criminal gangs. All of these security challenges have eroded the foundation of true democracy and imposed huge social, cultural and economic burdens on the larger society, particularly in Nigeria that cannot afford them. There is, however, no doubt that in Nigeria, justice and security are in comatose and there is the urgent need to institute citizens' security which is a fundamental part of human security rather than regime security. In contrast, there is regime security and total collapse in the country's security networks. This has become one of the major national issues confronting the nation in recent time. To this end, there is plethora of conceptual explanations as to the actual meaning of *citizens' security.* According to UNDPD's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2013) *citizen security* is the process of establishing, strengthening and protecting democratic civil order, as well as eliminating threats of all kinds or violence in population, and allowing for safe and peaceful coexistence.

It is also defined as "the safeguarding of inherent rights, especially that of life, personal integrity, inviolability of the home and freedom of movement. To this end, citizen security is not just reduction of crimes in the society but a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy for improving the quality of life of a population, prevention of crime, access to effective justice system, as well as provision of education base on values, respect for the rule of law; and ethnic, tribal or cultural tolerance (UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2013). According to Creative Associates International (2020) addressing citizen security means addressing the security challenges or insecurity situations of a nation-state in an appropriate manner, and through efficient and creative programme and security strategy that can redirect the lives of the citizens and build community trust on the government policies and its security agencies rather than destroying its fabrics.

In essence, building of lasting citizen security can only be achieved through a balanced approach that combines evidence-based social programmes, sensible public policies and constitutional and compassionate law enforcement. When a citizen feels secured and the rule of law is respected, then, there is citizen security. Regrettably, in Nigeria it seems that there is the absence of *citizens' security* and prioritisation of *regime security*. Apart from the threats from Boko Haram sect, ISWAP terrorist organisation, bandits, Fulani herders, kidnapping gangs, armed robbery; citizens' insecurity in the form of transnational organised crimes, violent attacks, inter communal and intra ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking, etc., posed challenges to Nigeria's democracy and citizen security in the recent years. This defines the insecurity situation of the Nigerian state in recent times.

IV. Empirical Review:

1. The Reasons Behind the Emerging Security Challenges and Trends Analysis in Nigeria

The inherent security challenges forged by domestic terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria have long historical dimensions. Of note are the reasons behind these debacles and the complex nature of their spread, sophistications cum source of funding, as well as technical and training supports. Extant literature on terrorism in the country have several but similar accounts of the origin of these megalomanias, most of which are said to be connected with the global jihad radical Islamic group, the al-Qaeda. However, chronological accounts or order of occurrence of each of these identified insurgent groups in Nigeria have become necessary in this study. This will enable us to ascertain and understand the actual reasons or motives behind these emerging insurgent groups in the country.

a. Jama' atu Ahalis Sunna Lidda' Awati Waah-Jihad (Boko Haram):

The rise of modern terrorism and the contemporary disturbance in Nigeria has its root traced to the emergence of Boko Haram Islamic sect, first, domesticated in Bornu state and later to other states in the North Eastern part of the country since 2001 when its leader, a 32 years old Muhammed Yusuf started the propagation of orthodox Islamic practice in Bornu state. The sect has its official name as Jama' atu Ahalis Sunna Lidda Awati Waah Jihad which in Arabic means *devoted or committed people who propagate the teaching of Prophet Mohammed*. The two words that made up the name "Boko Haram" are respectively, interpreted to mean, *Boko* in

Hausa language, *Western or Foreign*, while *Haram* in Arabic means, *Forbidden.* By implication, Boko Haram means, foreign or western education is forbidden or a sin (Onuoha, 2011).

Accordingly, the propagation of violence by the Boko Haram Islamic sect was sequel to the extra-judicial killing of its spiritual leader, Muhammed Yusuf who was captured by Nigerian military personnel but was immediately handed over to the State Police Command who extra-judicially killed him. After his death, his successor, Abubakar Mohammed Shekau assumed a revenge mission against the State government which later culminated into a full brown terrorist mission since 2009. Further investigations on the origin of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria linked the sect to the *1980s Maitatsine Uprising* which claimed several lives in five states of the northern Nigeria (Foster-Bowser & Sanders, 2012).

Alozieuwa (2012:1) links the origin of the Boko Haram Islamic sect in Nigeria to two broad but distinct spectrums with the first, essentially, to internal factors while the other was linked to external forces. In contrast, the former he said, focused its attention to socio-economic factors, as well as deep-seated political and religious differences in the country political environment or society; and also to the vengeance over the killing of the spiritual leader of the sect, Ustaz Yusuf Muhammed. The external factor was traced to the propagation of global Islamic jihad linked with international terror groups such as the al- Qaeda terrorist organisation (AQTO) or its affiliates al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). However, the reasons and motives behind Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are tied to these broad spectrums. Madike (2011) in Adibe (2012) cited in Alozieuwa (2012:1) opines that Boko Haram was founded around 2001 or 2002. He also traces its origin to as far back as 1995 and was initially known as Sahaba under the leadership of Lawan Abubakar who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia.

Since the sect assumed its vengeance mission in the country, its targeted attacks have been government and military installations; and public places such as motor parks, schools, churches, mosques and markets. Like other known transnational or international terrorist organisations in the form of al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Taliban, and ISIS or Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), Boko Haram followed the same trends in tactics and sophistication in propagating its mission in Nigeria. This explain why members of the terrorist organisation adopt anti-social tactics to carry out attacks on unsuspecting civilian population and government installations through the use of suicide bombers; blowing up of buildings, schools, churches, and mosques; shooting into crowded public places; and kidnapping of unsuspecting citizens, including children, young men and women (Oluka, 2019:18). Without doubt, the actions of this Islamic sect since 2009 have taken hundreds and thousands of lives; destructions of public and private properties; and displacement of persons living in the north eastern part of the country, the *ground zero* of the Boko Haram Islamic sect.

b.   Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP):

Like Boko Haram terrorist organisation, ISWAP formally known as Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah Lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jahad is a jihadist terrorist organisation based in North Eastern Nigeria and also active in Chad Republic, Niger Republic and Northern Cameroon (U.S Department of State, 2013). On 23 February 2020 pursuant to Paragraph 2 & 4 of UNSC Resolution 2368 (2017), **ISWAP** was declared an associate or affiliate of ISIL or Al-Qaida. There was,

however, the general believe that ISWAP is the same as Boko Haram following the March 2015 Abubakar Shekau's pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In August 2016, the leadership of ISIL recognised and appointed Abu Musad al-Barnawi as the de facto leader of ISWAP, which Abubakar Shekau refused to accept. As a consequence there was, first, division between the terrorist groups in Nigeria and other countries of the West African sub region, and secondly, infighting that finally splinted ISIL-West Africa into two factions with AL-Barnawi's faction as ISWAP and Abubakar Shekau's faction as the remnant of Boko Haram (UN Security Council, 2020).

Without doubt, this has changed the narratives of surge of insurgency in Nigeria in particular and Sahel region in general with tens of thousands of people killed and some displaced and are in internally displaced persons, IDP Camps all over the country as well as refugees in neighbouring countries of Benin, Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republics. Like the Boko Haram, **ISWAP** has been carrying out sundry attacks on government and military installations, public places, towns and villages in northern Nigeria and along the Lake Chad Basin, especially in Chad Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria in recent times. This group has also adopted anti-social tactics to perpetrate mayhem on unsuspecting civilian population in these regions. Notably, the net effect of the resurgence of jihadist force in the form of **ISWAP** around the Lake Chad region has been waging of guerrilla warfare on the national armed forces and the Lake Chad Basin Multi-National Joint Task Force (MN-JTF) comprising Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. In recent times, one is often confused about the major group that are responsible for terror attacks in the Lake Chad Basin due to the similarities in the modus operandi in the Boko Haram and ISWAP operations.

c.   The Bandits:

Without doubt, the activities of the bandits, particularly in the North West region of Nigeria of Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina states have surpassed that of Boko Haram and ISWAP put to together in recent time. This form of insurgency or rather terrorism, though, not yet declared as such, is said to have started as a farmer/herders conflict in 2011 and intensified its insurrections in the region between 2017 and 2018. However, literature on this form of insurrection revealed that it all started gradually, as a result of competition for scarce resources which include land and water due to the nature of the environment (see ACAPS, 2020).

Obviously, the annual environmental and ecological changes synonymous with this part of the country, including desertification, etc., led to the struggle for available scarce resources between *armed Fulani herdsmen and sedentary farmers of Hausa and non-Hausa tribes* in the region. Unfortunately, the seemingly slow intervention of the governments of the region and the Federal government to resolve this conflict through legal and legislative enactments, particularly on issues relating to land ownership and grazing rights, and the alleged politicisation of the conflict intensified the crisis and led to the emergence of criminal gangs of *Fulani ethnic extraction* who now attack towns and villages. Also of pertinent is the assumption by intelligence organisations of the infiltration of the group by Jihadist groups (International Crisis Group, ICG, 2020).

In recent time, the tactics and modus operandi of the bandits alleged to have been infiltrated by Islamic jihadist organisations, the ISWA in particular, have been the killing of civilians at will, cattle rustling, kidnapping

for ransom, sexual violence, and attacks and killings of road users travelling along the region leading to the displacement and disruption of their source of livelihood chiefly agriculture. It was estimated that about 210,000 people have been internally displaced, and some as refugees in the communal borders to Maradi in Niger Republic within the first quarter of this year (ACAPS, 2020). This form of insurgency in Nigeria's northwest states without satisfactory countermeasures on ground has raised fears that the region would soon be consumed by this group. There are also the fears that because of the recent clandestine migration of the Fulanis and Nigeriens suspected to be members of the insurgent groups of Boko Haram and ISWAP to other parts of Nigeria and the Sahel region, Nigeria and the entire Sahel region would soon be consumed completely by this group.

d. The Fulani Herdsmen:

The Funali herdsmen and sedentary farmers' crisis in Nigeria stems from a long history relating to feudalism, farming and herding, and has taken more lives in recent years than the other forms of insurgency in the country (Gregory, 2016). Oladele (2010) cited in Adishi and Oluka (2018:14) linked the conflict to the debilitating consequences of food production and lack of access to scarce resources induced by climate change in the Savannah area, first in Oyo state and later to other regions in Nigeria. In other words, climate change has been identified as the reason behind or the root cause of the conflict between farmers and Fulani herders in the country.

Suffice it therefore to state that the reality of this growing conflict is linked to the growing aridity or insufficient rainfall induced by climate change, particularly in northern Nigeria which has made it difficult for grazing for the Fulani nomads who now migrate to the Southern part of the country that is much lusher. Basically, climate change has been the major source of the conflict and insecurity posed by Fulani herders-farmers in the country (Adishi & Oluka). This form of insurgency is alleged to be hijacked by criminal bandits and the top hierarchy of Boko Haram terrorist organisation to cause harms, injuries and deaths in local communities and farm settlements across the country. Like the other insurgent groups in recent time farmer-herder violence has taken thousands of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands, particularly in the Nigerian Middle Belt or the North Central sin the return to democracy in 1999.

The major target has been the sedentary farming rural communities, and by extension, in some towns in both southern and northern Nigeria with a death toll that has almost doubled that inflicted by the bandits. There is also the fear that this form of insurgency might spread to the other parts of West Africa like the Boko Haram and ISWAP have done (Ilo, Jonathan-Ichaver & Ademolekun, 2019). Rather than help find solutions to the conflict, the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari was involved in a provocative and repulsive attempt to establish *Ruga Settlement*, which in *Fulfulde*, the language spoken by the Fulani, *means a small settlement for herders* all over the country through a failed executive bill to the 8th and 9th National Assembly respectively, and which was seem by critics as a conspiracy to colonise Nigeria for his Fulani kinsmen (Oluka, Ativie & Efeosa-Temple, 2019:1267). There is, therefore, no solution in sight to this form of insurgency now and in the nearest future which has been made more difficult by the spread of threats from the Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and other forms of crimes in the country.

2.   Regime Security, Citizens' Security and the Outcry for the Removal of the Security Service Chiefs

In the face of these security challenges of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, ISWAP terrorist group, criminal bandits, herders-farmers conflict, kidnapping, armed robbery and other forms of crimes in Nigeria, and the seemingly inability of the Federal government, state governments and the security agencies in the country to counter these insurgencies, a lot of questions that are yet to be answered were raised by critics, observers and analysts alike. As at today, Nigeria is becoming a theatre of massacres and mass atrocities despite the presence of the security agencies in all the affected states of the Federation, particularly in Central Kaduna in Kaduna state, Adamawa, Yobe, Bornu, to mention but a few.

Human rights violations and abuse of the rule of law by the security agencies, particularly the police, Department of State Service (DSS) and the army since the return to civil rule in May 1999 have also been identified as problems in our contemporary society. In contrast, there are several instances and cases of violations of human rights and abuse of the rule law by the government officials and security personnel while combating insurgencies and carrying out orders from the presidency. Rather than performing their constitutional responsibilities to the citizens and the nation at large, which are the protection of internal security, lives and properties, defence and protection of national integrity, they are often engaged in abuse of the rule of law. All of these, complicated, by the activities of the insurgent groups in the country, have degenerated to the extent that Nigerians have lost confidence in the abilities of the security service chiefs and personnel to protect lives and properties, and their inabilities to confront the security challenges in the country.

However, the rising waves of banditry, kidnapping for ransom, Boko Haram, ISWAP and Fulani herders attacks in the north-west, north-east and other regions, have intensified the outcry of the removal of the security service chiefs in the country. Of note was the massive protects organised by the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG) in Katsina state, the president's own state of origin, as well as the condemnations of the escalating security crises all over the country by some notable Nigerians such as the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar, and some socio-cultural groups such as the Northern Elders Forum (NEF), the Afenifere- the Yoruba socio-cultural group, and the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), an apex socio-cultural group in the Niger Delta region (Deji & Omololu, 2020).

All of these and several other incidences prompted and galvanised the presidency to a renewed efforts to ensure that lives and properties of Nigerians or citizens' security are protected, as well as to restore public confidence in his administration's capability to protect lives, unity and socio-economic well-being of Nigerians. Subsequently, President Muhammadu Buhari asked the security service chiefs in a meeting held in Abuja, the Federal Capital city, and attended by all the Security Chiefs, including the Chief of Defence Staff - General Abayomi Olanisakin; Chief of Army Staff - Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai; Chief of Naval Staff - Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas; Chief of Air Staff - Air Marshal Sadiq Abubakar; Director General of the Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA) - Ahmed Rufai Abubakar; Director General of the Department of State of Service (DSS) - Yusuf Bichi; Chief of Defence Intelligence Agency - Air Vice Marshal Mohammed Sani Utman; Minister of Defence - Brig-Gen.

Bashir Magashi (rtd); National Security Adviser - Major General Babagana Monguno (rtd) and some of the political appointees in the presidency, to step-up their collective efforts to combating these security challenges in the country. Subsequently, the president warned the service chiefs that his administration would no longer tolerate further deteriorating security conditions in the country (Deji & Omololu, 2020; Vanguard News Editorial, 2020).

Notably also, the President expressed concern on the increasing rate of proliferation of hard drugs and other narcotic substances in the country, as well as small and light arms, all of which have been exposed to the terrorist groups and criminal bandits in the north-east and north-west regions of the country as stimulators and sources of funding of their devilish acts against the government and the citizens, hence, undermining citizens' security. The presidency was said to had also expressed its concern over the use of unregistered SIM card in the country, noting that insecurity will not be checked if this is not regularised by the Minister of Communications and Digital Economy, Ali Pantami (Deji & Omololu, 2020). In essence, the sales of none registered SIM cards by the telecommunication companies, major dealers and vendors has promoted the activities of these insurgent groups and other forms of crimes in the country by providing them easy and faster communication.

Following the unending but rather increasing insecurity problems in the country and the ability of the Security Chiefs to win the fight against these security challenges, the Lower Chamber of the National Assembly (the House of Representatives) on 29 January 2020, passed a resolution calling on the military chiefs to resign or be fired by the president of the Federal Republic. Earlier this year, the Upper Chamber of the National Assembly (the Senate) expressed concerns on the increased rate of security challenges in the country and the view that the Service Chiefs have to go to give ways for new hands and ideas. The House of Representatives argued that under military rules, the term of office of the security chiefs has long expired since 2017 following their appointments by President Buhari immediately his assumption of office for his first term as the president of the federal republic in 2015. Upon his re-election as the president in 2019, the security chiefs were retained, a situation that the house sees as not necessary since the term of office of the present service chiefs has long expired following military regulation concerning the tenure of office of the service chiefs (Campbell, 2020).

Essentially too, the House, observers and analysts alike believe that since the security chiefs have not been able to defeat all the insecurity issues, especially Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorism in the north-east, banditry in north-central and north-west regions of the country, kidnapping and Fulani herders attacks in the Middle Belt and virtually all parts of the country but most significantly in Kaduna state, there is the need to remove the present security chiefs and appoint new but efficient hands to conduct the affairs of the security services in the country. It is also of pertinence to note that the surge in security issues in the country in recent time, has prompted, first, the Governors of the Western states of Nigeria to establish a regional security network, *Operation Amotekun (Leopard)*, founded on 9 January 2020 in Ibadan, Oyo State, to supplement and assist the police force in the face of security challenges in the region such as kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, Fulani herdsmen attacks on farmers, communities across the region and other forms of offences (Campbell, 2020; Olawole, 2020).

Presently, the South-Eastern and the South-South states are at the verge of encouraging community policing as a supplement to the police force and Civil Defence Corps in fighting crimes with local vigilante groups

encouraged, strengthened and assigned under the supervision of Divisional Police Chiefs. Delta state Governor, Senator(Dr.) Ifeanyi Arthur Okowa has taken the lead in this form of security arrangement in fighting crimes in local communities, towns and cities across the state. We should be reminded that one of the campaign promises of President Buhari and his All Progressive Congress (APC) is the fight against insurgency, terrorism and other forms of security problems in the country, though several efforts have be made over the years by the Federal government, yet these insecurity issues seem to be unabated, hence, the outcry for the sack of the SSCs in the country by Nigerians in recent time.

V.   Summary and Conclusion

The extent of violence perpetrated by insurgent groups of the Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and Fulani herdsmen in recent times have left no doubt that the government and the security service chief have performed below the expectations of the Nigerian civil society and have compromised citizens' security for regime security. So far the violence occasioned by the activities of these insurgent groups have far reaching effects on humanitarian, social and economic wellbeing of the people in the North East and North West in particular, and other parts of the country in general. Livestock and crop productions have been in the decrease since the emergence of these insurgent groups in the country due to the killings and destructions of farm lands, as well as displacement of villagers and farmers whom their major source of livelihood is farming. This has further worsened the already declined human livelihood indices occasioned by the recent global economic recession and the outbreak of the novel COVID-19 pandemic.

Military interventions and operations in these regions against these armed insurgent groups have also impacted negatively to the wellbeing's of the people. Much as some members of the insurgent groups are dispersed to the other parts of the country for safety and creating the fears of a possible regrouping and orchestration of violence in these regions, so the civilian population is dispersed to IDP camps, neighbouring states and countries. It is, however, no longer strange that the foremost priority of these criminal gangs is to extend their alleged jihadist mission and strengthen their attacks on innocent civilian population in other parts of the country, particularly in the south-south, south-west and south-east regions of the country which are already experiencing, with slightest confrontations, occasional attacks of villages and towns by Fulani herders with sophisticated weapons.

Since the emergence of these form of security challenges in the northern Nigeria, and by extension, in other parts of the country; women and girls have been susceptible to sexual violence and other forms of abuses including rape; forced marriages to the captains, commanders and members of the terrorists groups of Boko Haram and ISWAP in particular. As attacks by the bandits continues, the affected citizens of Nigeria have expressed lack of trust towards the security agencies, particularly the army and the police because of their inability to contain or combat the nefarious attacks by the insurgent groups. This has in recent time strengthened the outcry for the sack of the security service chiefs in the country. Suffice it therefore to opine that government's security responses to these security problems, especially in the wake of Boko Haram insurgency, appears to have been inefficient and

ineffective despite the launching of several security operations or Joint Task Force (JTF) made up of personnel from the Army, police force and other security forces, and with different code names such as *Operation Lafiya Dole*, etc.

Premised on these insufficiencies of the security agencies and their Service Chiefs, civil-military relation has been put to severe threat in recent time with no trust and confidence in the armed forces of the federation. By and large, all of these insecurity issues in our contemporary Nigerian society seem to be unabated, and even in the nearest future following the inability of the government and his security chiefs to sufficiently combat these insurgencies. Although, efforts have be made by both the federal and state governments to fight crimes in the country, and in various states of the federation as seen in the case of *Operation Amotekun* in South-West Nigeria, and the establishment of uniform vigilante groups and Anti- Cultism group in some states under the supervision of Divisional Police Officers (DPOs).

Yet, the country is still faced with intensified terror attacks by the insurgent groups of Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and Fulani herders' attacks, and other forms of security challenges, as well as compromising citizens' security. The consequence of this is the public outcry over lack of government commitment to promote citizen security, reduce crime and other forms of violence, and contain the conflict between the Fulani herders and farmers that has taken thousands of lives. And lack of credibility of public institutions such as the judiciary, the police and the armed forces. This poor quality citizen security, undeniably, has affected the different sections of the Nigerian public or population over the years.

VI.   Recommendations

This study, thus, provides the following policy options or recommendations that are likely to ameliorate or completely contain the spread of these insurgent groups and attacks in the country:

1.   Government of the Federation should improve on border security to stem the inflow of jihadist groups, small and light weapons into the country through the nation's porous borders. By and large, this would no doubt check the excessive inflow of both insurgent recruits and weapons into the country.

2.   The government should also improve on its forestry department all over the country, but most importantly, in the northeast and northwest region of the country in which the insurgents have found *safe haven* and from where they carry out their devilish acts of terrorism. This no doubt would check, and to an extent, the movement of these criminal gangs and their recruits along the country's forest region. It could also reduce the easy habitation of the forest as hideout and training field for the insurgent groups, especially the Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorist groups.

3.   The northern region of Nigeria currently has the highest number of out-of-school children, poor and illiterate parents, all of which have made it very easy for these insurgent and terrorist groups to penetrate the area, indoctrinate, recruit and coerced the younger generations to believing in the jihadist teachings; the consequence of which is higher rate of insurgent attacks in the regions. However, the states in collaboration with the Federal government should create an enabling environment for the less privileged citizens of these regions to have access to

social necessities. This undeniably would ameliorate the spread of jihad ideology and indoctrination of unsuspecting citizens, especially in the northern part of the country.

4.　　　We suggest also a total intervention of the government in the programmes and teachings of the Quranic schools in northern Nigeria. In other words, the government should design and supervise their curriculum in order to check what the Islamic scholars are impacting on these groups of unsuspecting civilian population in the region.

5.　　　The security services including the Police force, DSS, Army and NIA in the country should be sufficiently funded and equipped with modern days sophisticated weapons such as fire arms, and security gadgets such as communication devices, as well as the establishment of functional and efficient Central Criminal Registry (CCR) to record and register fingerprints of Nigerian citizens and foreigners entering the country through its borders. Most significantly, using Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and Live scan finger prints capture device and functional laboratory as seen in developed country like the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, etc. These would no doubt improve the forensic technology in crime management and control, and terrorism in the country.

6.　　　It is also necessary for the government to have the birth and death of every citizen to be recorded. Alternatively, the National Identity Card and National Passports should be efficiently adopted as mandatory instruments for identifying citizens and none citizens in the country at any given time. These should also be adopted as means for identifying travellers on inter and intra-states movement in the country, particularly at the borders of the 36 states including the Federal capital territory. In essence, the security check points should be equipped with electronic gadgets or computers to verify the identity of any suspect within the state borders through the identification numbers on the NID Card or passport. Unidentified individual should be immediately interrogated by the security unit to verify his or her state of origin or legality in the country. This, to a reasonably extent, would check the movement of illegal immigrants into the country through our land borders, and to identify who is a Nigerian and alternatively, Nigerien or Chadian who are often alleged by the Federal Government to form the majority of members of the terrorist groups and bandits in the country.

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